University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2005

Respecting Religious Liberty: Why Rluipa Does
Not Violate the Establishment Clause
Matthew D. Krueger

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Krueger, Matthew D., "Respecting Religious Liberty: Why Rluipa Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause" (2005). Minnesota Law
Review. 678.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/678

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Respecting Religious Liberty: Why RLUIPA Does
Not Violate the Establishment Clause
Matthew D. Krueger*
Jerry Charles, a practicing Muslim and inmate in a Wisconsin correctional institution, faithfully prayed five times a
day.' Prior to praying, he removed offensive body odors through
a ritual cleansing with a small amount of fragrant prayer oil.2
Due to overcrowding, prison officials instituted strict limits on
what personal property inmates could keep. 3 Unfortunately for
Charles and the recipients of his emanations, the list of approved items did not include prayer oils, and officials barred
him from possessing them. 4 Under the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause, 5 Charles lacked any recourse because the
State only had to show that its denial of the prayer oils was6
reasonably related to some legitimate penological interest.
Charles, however, had access to another legal tool--one that ultimately allowed him to keep a small quantity of prayer oil in
7
his cell.

That tool was the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 20008 (RLUIPA). RLUIPA significantly increases the level of scrutiny courts apply to government policies
*

J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2000,

University of Wisconsin. The author thanks Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen

for his insightful counsel; editors Catherine Biestek, David Bryce, Aaron
Johnson, and Ryan Stai for their guidance; and his wife, Sarah, for her unwavering encouragement.
1. Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2003).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2002),
affd, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
7. See Verhagen, 348 F.3d at 611 (affirming the district court's grant of
summary judgment for Charles's claim brought under the RLUIPA).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
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that infringe on inmates' religious practices. RLUIPA provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ...unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person (1) is in the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.9

Prior to enacting RLUIPA, Congress received testimony
that institutions often arbitrarily denied people the opportunity
to practice their religions. Therefore, Congress intended
RLUIPA to protect religious exercise against unreasonable interference. 10 Under RLUIPA, prison officials had to show that
preventing Charles from keeping his prayer oil served a compelling governmental interest through the least restrictive
means-a showing the officials could not make."
Some argue that RLUIPA violates the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause 12 by granting religious individuals an
exercise protection unavailable to nonreligious persons. 13 For
example, consider Charles's hypothetical atheist cellmate who
wants to maintain and use a bit of cologne because he possesses
strong hygienic sensibilities. If cologne is not on the prison's list
of approved items, the cellmate cannot access RLUIPA's protections. To opponents of RLUIPA, such as Justice Stevens, the
statute provides believers with "a legal weapon that no atheist
14
or agnostic can obtain."'
In Cutter v.Wilkinson,' 5 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted Justice Stevens's logic and held that RLUIPA violates
the Establishment Clause "by giving religious prisoners rights
superior to those of nonreligious prisoners."'16 The court consolidated three groups of prisoners' claims brought under
RLUIPA and sustained the State's facial challenge to the statute.' 7 The court's ruling created a split with the seven other cir9. Id. § 2000cc-1.
10. See 146 CONG. REC.S6688 (daily ed. Jul. 13, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
11. See Verhagen, 348 F.3d at 611.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
14. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to RLUIPA's predecessor which contains the same substantive
provisions).
15. 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct 12,
2004) (No. 03-9877).
16. Id. at 266.
17. Id. at 260.
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cuit courts that have upheld RLUIPA or similar statutes
against Establishment Clause challenges.' 8
The rationale of the Cutter decision would redefine the
scope of religious liberty under the Religion Clauses by prohibiting the state from accommodating religious exercise. An accommodation is a law or governmental action that facilitates
the free exercise of religion, usually by exempting individuals
from a generally applicable law that conflicts with their religious belief or practice. 19 Accommodations of religion are common throughout state and federal law. 20 For example, Minne-

sota law exempts those who perform circumcision as a religious
ritual from medical licensing requirements. 21 Similarly,
RLUIPA mandates that prisons and other institutions exempt
religious exercise from general regulations in certain situa22
tions.
The Supreme Court's rulings on accommodations leave unsettled when an accommodation shades into an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 23 The Court granted certiorari
to Cutter and has the opportunity to settle the matter this
Term. 24 This Note explores how the Court should rule on the
Establishment Clause challenge to RLUIPA. Part I describes
the development of RLUIPA by situating it Within the context
of the shifting jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. 2 5 Part II
describes competing theories of accommodations under the Re18. Four circuits have rejected Establishment Clause challenges to
RLUIPA. See Benning v. Georgia, Nos. 04-10979 & 04-11044, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24842, at *20 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2004); Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310,
322 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Bass v. Madison, 72
U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2004) (No.03-1404); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d
601, 611 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2002). Three additional circuits have denied similar challenges to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (enacted
2003) (invalidated as applied to the states by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)), which preceded RLUIPA and contains the same substantive protections. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Catholic
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73
F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
19. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT.
REV. 1, 3-4.
20. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
21. See MINN. STAT. § 147.09(10) (2004).
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
23. See infra notes 125-74 and accompanying text.
24. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct 12, 2004) (No. 039877).
25. See infra notes 29-75 and accompanying text.
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ligion Clauses and then analyzes the key cases involving accommodations of religion. 26 With this background, Part III ar27
gues that RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Part IV briefly explains how the Court can promote the princi2
ples of religious liberty by upholding RLUIPA. 8
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
At first blush RLUIPA seems an odd law: why combine accommodation of religious land use along with the religious exercise of institutionalized persons in a single enactment? The
answer lies in the evolution of free exercise jurisprudence and a
battle between Congress and the Court over the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause. Tracing these developments reveals
RLUIPA's significance.
The First Amendment begins: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."29 The Free Exercise Clause protects religious
freedom from governmental interference. 30 Some believe this
requires the state to exempt individuals from laws that conflict
with their religious duties. 31 The Establishment Clause, however, demands that government remain neutral toward religion, 32 which some conclude requires government to treat all positions on religion equally. 33 The Court has read neither clause
in absolute terms-which would tend to negate one or the
other-but has acknowledged a realm of permissible accommodations of religion. 34 In this realm, the Free Exercise Clause

26. See infra notes 76-174 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 175-264 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
31. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1602 (1997)
(reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)).
32. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (stating "a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause" is that "government should not
prefer one religion to another or religion to irreligion"). But cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.").
33. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) ("[T]here is
room for play in the joints" between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))).
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does not mandate, nor does the Establishment Clause bar, the
discretion in
accommodation of religion; the state may exercise
35
deciding whether to extend the accommodation.
A. FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE: THE SHIFTING LINE
BETWEEN MANDATORY AND PERMISSIBLE ACCOMMODATIONS

Less stable than the realm of permissible, discretionary accommodations in the Court's jurisprudence has been whether
the Free Exercise Clause obligates the government to accommodate religion. Prior to 1963, the Court generally held that
the Free Exercise Clause did not require the government to exempt religious objectors from generally applicable laws (i.e.,
laws that are facially neutral toward and not intended to re37
strict religion).3 6 In that year, the Court in Sherbert v.Verner
sustained a Seventh Day Adventist's challenge to South Carolina's withholding of unemployment benefits after the challenger declined employment that required working on Saturdays. 38 Emphasizing the burden of having to choose between
obedience to religious precepts and accepting work, 39 the majority held that the Free Exercise Clause required the State to exempt the plaintiff from the regulation. 40 The Court applied
strict scrutiny, holding that because the law placed a "substantial" burden on the plaintiffs religious exercise, the State had
to prove the law served a "compelling state interest" in the
41
least restrictive manner.
This heightened protection for conscientious religious exercise persisted in judicial rhetoric for several decades, and the
Court sustained several other challenges to unemployment
compensation denials. 42 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 43 the Court of-

35. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 24-34 (discussing permissible accommodations of religion).
36. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (refusing to exempt an Orthodox Jew from Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (denying a Mormon's request for
relief from a federal criminal sanction against bigamy).
37. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. Id. at 400-01.
39. Id. at 404.
40. Id. at 410.
41. Id. at 406-07. The 'least restrictive means" language first appeared in
Thomas v. Review Board., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981), but derives from Sherbert's statement that the state must show "no alternative forms of regulation"
exist. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
42. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
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fered perhaps its most robust protection of religious liberty, exempting an Amish family from a compulsory school-attendance
law. 44 The Court was unwilling, however, to mandate accommodations in other arenas, despite the exacting Sherbert standard. 45 In the prison context, the Court abandoned heightened
scrutiny altogether, applying only rationality review to state
interference with prisoners' fundamental rights, including the
exercise of religion. 46 As it limited Sherbert's holding in various
cases, the Court evinced concern that such rigorous scrutiny
was unworkable, forcing governments to conform regulations to
47
individuals' consciences.
In the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith,4 s the
Court formally held that the Sherbert standard did not apply to
generally applicable government action that substantially burdens religious exercise. 49 The plaintiff had been fired from his
job at a drug rehabilitation center for ingesting peyote as part
of a Native American ritual. 5 The State of Oregon denied the
plaintiffs application for unemployment compensation because
he was discharged for "misconduct," prompting his free exercise
claim. 5 1 In denying the plaintiffs claim, the Court construed
Sherbert's strict scrutiny standard to contradict most precedents 52 and to undermine democratic government by making
each conscience "a law unto itself."5 3 Also, the Court said the
test raised the undesirable specter of judges weighing the centrality of an action to a religious faith to determine what ex54
emptions to grant.

146 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720.
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. See id. at 234-35.
45. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 458 (1988) (allowing the U.S. Forest Service to build a road through
an area sacred to Indians).
46. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987); Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-91 (1987).
47. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986) ('The Free Exercise
Clause... does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the
Government's internal procedures.")
48. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
49. Id. at 885.
50. Id. at 874.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 884-86.
53. Id. at 890 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878)).
54. Id. at 886-87.
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Even as it greatly reduced the realm of mandatory religious accommodations, the Smith Court emphasized that the
State could enact accommodations beyond what the Free Exercise Clause required:
[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious beliefs can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legis-

lation as well.... But to say that a nondiscriminatory religiouspractice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
5
say that it is constitutionally required ....

Smith explicitly left the distribution of exemptions to the
political process and noted approvingly that many states voluntarily granted exceptions to drug laws for sacramental peyote
a large realm of
use. 56 The Smith majority thus envisioned
57
permissible, discretionary accommodations.
B. CONGRESS REACTS: RFRA AND RLUIPA

Smith alarmed many observers who quickly mobilized to
counteract the decision, fearing that its logic would allow the
government to trample religious exercise. 58 At the urging of a
diverse coalition of religious groups, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199359 (RFRA). RFRA explicitly repudiated Smith with an avowed purpose "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner...
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise
is substantially burdened ..."60
This, however, was not to be the last word. In City of
Boerne v. Flores,6 1 the Court held RFRA was an exercise of
power in excess of the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement
Clause.6 2 Finding RFRA's protections to be widely disproportionate to any problem of religious discrimination shown in the
congressional record, the Court held RFRA substantively rede55. See id. at 890.
56. Id.
57. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update
and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 709-12 (1992).
58. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 895-96 (1994) (describing the history of

RFRA).

59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000); see also David .E. Anderson,
Signing of Religious Freedom Act Culminates 3-Year Push, WASH. POST, Nov.
20, 1993, at C6.
60. § 2000bb.
61. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
62. Id. at 532. A church in Boerne, Texas brought a challenge under
RFRA to the city's denial of a building permit. Id. at 512.
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fined the free exercise right, mandating that states grant accommodations of religion beyond what Smith required. 63 City of
Boerne did not invalidate RFRA's applicability to the federal
government; it voided RFRA only as applied to state and local
64
governments.
With RFRA's applicability severely limited, Congress
sought other means to protect religious exercise from burdensome state and local regulations. Its response was RLUIPA.65
Drawing lessons from City of Boerne, Congress grounded the
institutionalized persons provision of the Act in its commerce
and spending powers. 66 Like the Sherbert test and RFRA,
RLUIPA prohibits governments from substantially burdening
religious exercise, save to serve a compelling state interest using the least restrictive means. 67 Early versions of RLUIPA applied the prohibition to any government action supported by
federal funding or affecting interstate commerce. 68 Fearing that
such an expansive provision would suffer the same fate as
RFRA, Congress limited RLUIPA to two areas in which it
heard significant testimony documenting religious discrimination: land use and institutions such as prisons. 69 Regarding
prison practices, Congress heard of restrictions on religious liberty such as: officials recording a prisoner's sacramental confession to a chaplain; preventing prisoners from wearing religious jewelry; forbidding a prisoner to take communion; 70
limiting the length of inmates' facial hair;71 and refusing to pro63. Id. at 530-32.
64. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Bass v. Madison, 72 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2004) (No.
03-1404).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
66. See § 2000cc-l(b); 146 CONG. REC. S6689 (daily ed. Jul. 13, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
67. See § 2000cc-1.
68. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 2000, S. 2081, 106th Cong.
(2000); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, S.2148, 105th Cong. (1998).
69. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (daily ed. Jul. 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch & Sen. Kennedy) (describing testimony that prison officials "impose frivolous or arbitrary rules ... restrict[ing] religious liberty" and
the hearing record's "massive evidence" of burdens on religious land use).
70. Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the
Constitutionalityof a Religious ProtectionMeasure: HearingBefore the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 92 (1999) (statement of Douglas Laycock, Prof., Univ. of Texas Law Sch.).
71. A Bill to Protect Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, S. 2148, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of David Zwiebel,
Dir. of Gov't Affairs, Agudath Israel of Am.).
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vide inmates with kosher food. 72
While states defending suits brought under RLUIPA have
argued that Congress again exceeded its constitutional grant of
power, several circuit courts have upheld the institutionalized
73
persons provision under the spending power. A more weighty
challenge to RLUIPA has emerged on Establishment Clause
grounds. The Sixth Circuit recently ruled in Cutter v. Wilkinson 74 that RLUIPA has the unconstitutional effect of advancing
religion. 75 The rationale of the Cutter decision has the potential
to undermine the legitimacy of all permissible, discretionary
accommodations. To evaluate the validity of this decision, Part
II provides the relevant legal and theoretical background with
an eye towards evaluating RLUIPA's constitutionality in Part
III. Part II first explains how accommodations align with the
purposes of the Religion Clauses and critiques the "equal
treatment" theory of the Clauses on which the Cutter court
based its decision.
II. ACCOMMODATIONS OF RELIGION UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The key issues Cutter raises are the propriety of, and limits
on, discretionary accommodations under the Establishment
Clause. Note that at issue here are "religion-specific" lawsaccommodations or exemptions of religious exercise only.
RLUIPA is religion-specific: it does nothing to protect actions
76
undertaken to comport with secular norms. This category excludes "religion-neutral" laws-generally applicable laws that
include religious entities or exercise along with secular counterparts in the pursuit of a broader legislative goal. For example, few doubt that a city may exempt churches from property
77
taxes along with other nonprofit and charitable organizations.
Thus, this Note uses "accommodations" and "exemptions" to
mean only religion-specific laws.

72.

H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 9 (1999).

73.

See, e.g., Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 611 (7th Cir. 2003);

Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002).

74. 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct.
12, 2004) (No. 03-9877).
75. Id. at 267.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
77. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
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A. ACCOMMODATIONS OF RELIGION ALIGN WITH THE PURPOSES
OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

Accommodations are important tools by which the state
can respect religion's unique place in people's lives, and avoid
unnecessary clashes between the state's ubiquitous regulations
and individuals' religious exercise.7 8 Because accommodations
are religion-specific, some readings of the Establishment
Clause forbid legislatures from enacting them.7 9 A number of

scholars justify their opposition to accommodations on the prin-

ciple of equal treatment, both among religions and between religion and nonreligion.8 0 They argue the Establishment Clause
and a general constitutional norm of equality requires that
government treat all positions on religion, including the absence of religion, similarly.S1 Under the "equal treatment" view,
religious accommodations are problematic because their effect
is to grant different legal rights on the basis of one's religious
82
adherence or lack thereof.
The equal treatment view offers only a partial explanation
of the Religion Clauses' purposes.8 3 Undoubtedly, the Clauses
protect all individuals equally from state-imposed coercion of
beliefs. For example, a state may not bar anyone from holding

public offices on the basis of their religious beliefs or lack

thereof.8 4 The state may not require anyone to profess certain
beliefs or engage in religious exercise. 85 Similarly, state action
intended to restrict particular beliefs or religious practices runs
afoul of the Free Exercise Clause.8 6
78. For a good summary of the arguments in favor of the broad use of accommodations, see McConnell, supra note 57, at 688-94.
79. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
555, 580 (1991).
80. See William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,75 IND. L.J. 193, 196-200 (2000).
81. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty,
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (2001); Lupu, supra note 79, at 567.
82. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 80, at 204.
83. See Timothy L. Hall, Omnibus Protectionsof Religious Liberty and the
Establishment Clause, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 539, 546-47 (1999).
84. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (voiding a state ban on
clergy serving as legislators or constitutional convention delegates).
85. E.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (invalidating
Maryland's religious test for public officials).
86. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546 (1993) (striking a law "burdening religious practice that is not neutral or
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The equal treatment view fails to capture a central purpose
of the Free Exercise Clause: the protection of religious liberty,
as such.8 7 The very existence of the Clause suggests that the

Framers considered religious liberty a substantively distinct
freedom. 88 Congressional records show that earlier drafts of the
Free Exercise Clause also included a provision protecting a

"right of conscience," which likely included both religious and

nonreligious convictions regarding right and wrong-in essence, the equal treatment standard.8 9 The final drafts protected only the exercise of religion, suggesting the Free Exercise Clause's protections are specifically limited to religious
liberty. 90
The Framers understood religious liberty as the believer's
ability to prioritize within limits, the duties owed to God over
those owed to the state. 9 1 James Madison framed it this way:
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence. The Religion then of every man must be left to the
and it is the right of every
conviction and conscience of every man;
92
man to exercise it as these may dictate.

Religious duties and beliefs carry severe consequences and
special importance, making them significantly different from

not of general application").
87. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 1 (calling religious liberty the "central value and animating purpose of the Religion Clauses"); Michael A.
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311,
313 (1986) (arguing that the two clauses serve the single value of religious liberty). But see Lupu, supra note 79, at 567-68 (considering religious liberty just
one of several equally important purposes of the Religion Clauses).
88. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 16 (arguing that the Religion Clauses "presuppose that religion is in
some way a special human activity, requiring special rules applicable only to
it").
89. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488-96 (1990).
90. See id. (concluding that, regardless of what is the correct explanation
for the change, nonreligious "conscience" is not included within the Free Exercise Clause); Paulsen, supra note 87, at 333 n.106.
91. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and
Why? 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 95, 117 (2001) ("For the Founders, the exercise of
religion was not a difficult concept; it was the performance of duties owed to
God.").
92. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 n.2 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 184
(G. Hunt ed., 1901)) (internal citations omitted).
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other actions and convictions. 93 From the believer's perspective,
disobeying a religious command could affect her eternal destiny
and amount to an act of irreverence toward the divine. 94 Thus,
the believer faces a "special cruelty" when a government regulation forces a choice between the state's punishment for lawbreaking and the spiritual consequences of breaking a religious
95
rule.

Granting accommodations out of respect for the uniqueness
of religious convictions may strike some as problematic in a
modern, pluralistic society in which many adhere to a variety of
nontheistic religions or deeply held, but nonreligious, belief systems. 96 This reality presents the inherent difficulties of explicitly defining religion separate from other beliefs and the related
potential for unfairly including or excluding claimants. Consider, for example, two cellmates who object to eating pork, one
an Orthodox Jew and the other a vegetarian deeply holding the
nonreligious belief that meat production is cruel to animals and
an inefficient use of resources. Equal treatment proponents argue that the anguish felt by the two cellmates is indistinguishable; conscience, after all, is common to all people.9 7 On this
view, religious objectors may still seek exemptions from oppressive laws, but legislatures must make the exemption available
to similarly situated nonreligious objectors as well. 98 Support-

ers of equal treatment often point to conscientious objector
cases of the Vietnam War era in which the Court sided with
this approach. 99 In United States v. Seeger, 0 0 the Court inter93.
94.

See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 53 (1996).
Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion"in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U.

ILL. L. REV. 579, 597-99.

95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 81, at 1016 (arguing that government
must "recognize the importance of both religious and nonreligious values in a
modern, pluralistic society"); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1260-62 (1994) (arguing that in a
community of divergent values, it is "unacceptably sectarian" for religious factions each to claim their obligations are the highest law).
97. See Bressman, supra-note 81, at 1017 (arguing that the legal "distinction between religious and nonreligious conscience has become increasingly
murky"); Marshall, supra note 80, at 203-05.
98. For a comprehensive discussion of such an approach, see Bressman,
supranote 81.
99. See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom
RestorationAct to FederalLaw Without Violating the Constitution,99 MICH. L.
REV. 1903, 1978-82 (2001).
100. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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preted a statutory exemption from military duty for religious
conscientious objections to include any "sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies ... a place parallel to that filled by the
10 1
Five
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption."'
10 2
the Court concluded
years later in Welsh v. United States,
that even nonreligious beliefs imposing a0 3"duty of conscience"
upon a person can occupy that God-place.
While the broad Seeger/Welsh view of "religion" has the
virtue of tolerance-ensuring that claimants holding untraditional or unusual beliefs are not neglected-this view tends to
diminish the freedom afforded to claimants. 10 4 This is because
legislatures and courts are unlikely to offer both strong protections from general laws and wide accessibility to those protections.' 0 5 To do so would invite each person to craft the law unto
herself, undermining both the democratic process and the rule
of law. 10 6 As one commentator noted, a broad definition of religion becomes a "poison pill" to the pro-accommodations position:
the less rothe more inclusive the class of potential objectors,
10 7
bust and available are the accommodations.
Recognizing the problems presented by the SeegeriWelsh
notion of religion, the Court has since reaffirmed that the Free
Exercise Clause distinguishes between conscientious religious
exercise and other conscientious conduct.1 08 The Court's fullest
explication came just a few years after Welsh in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.10 9 In sustaining an Amish family's challenge to the
state's compulsory education law, the Court explained that one
could not avoid a generally applicable law if the objection:

101.

Id. at 176.

102. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
103. Id. at 340.
104. Cf. Choper, supra note 94, at 591 (describing the "obvious relationship
between the legal definition of religion" and the substantive scope of religious
freedom).
105. See id.
106. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarificationof the
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 251-52 (1989).
107. Paulsen, supra note 31, at 1603-04.
108. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (affirming that because the "protection accorded to religious belief' is a constitutional
value, legislatures may respect that value by enacting accommodations); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) ("Only beliefs rooted in religion
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special
protection to the exercise of religion.").
109. 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
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is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief....
mhe very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person
to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as
a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their
claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau
rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden
Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's
choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such
belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. 11o

This passage provides a useful starting point for defining
conscientious religious exercise by identifying two distinct
bases for conscientious claims: religion and ideology. 1 1' Professor Stanley Ingber explains that an "ideology" developed as a
concept within the Enlightenment and emphasized the individual's use of reason, rationality, and sensory experiences to derive truth and values.1 1 2 In this way, ideologies differ from religious perspectives, which look to an extrasensory, transcendent
reality to ascertain truth, values, and beliefs. 113 Thus conceived, a religion may be nontheistic, but all religions acknowledge an "otherworldly" or "sacred" source of meaning and authority. 114 Defining religion on the basis of a transcendent
element avoids the pitfall of excluding new, unusual, or nonWestern religions. 115
This definition also aligns with the Free Exercise Clause
rationale for accommodating religious exercise, recognizing
that from the believer's perspective religious beliefs carry ex-

110. Id.
111. The Court's categorization of Thoreau's beliefs as "philosophical and
personal" places them squarely within the realm of "ideology." See id.; cf. Ingber, supra note 106, at 279-82 (explaining the meaning and origin of the concept of "ideology" as compared to "religion"). This Note adopts Ingber's definition of "religion," having found it to align well with theological and lay notions
of the term, to provide a legally cognizable standard, and to accord best with
the purposes of the Religion Clauses. Other important scholarly works on this
topic include: Choper, supra note 94, at 599 (proposing "extra-temporal consequences" as the distinguishing mark of religious exercise); Kent Greenawalt,
Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 815 (1984)
(advocating an "analogical approach" rather than a specific definition); and
Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056,
1074-75 (1978) (proposing "ultimate concerns" as the definition of religious
beliefs).
112. Ingber, supra note 106, at 279.
113. See id. at 285-86.
114.

See id.

115.

Id. at 287.
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ceptional importance and consequences. 116 The believer understands religious duties and truths not as matters to be evalu117
ated and chosen, but as absolute and externally imposed.

When civil obligations clash with religious obligations or beliefs, the believer is caught between two authorities. Disobeying
the transcendent authority causes transcendent consequences.
Conversely, one who bases her objection to a civil obligation on
an ideology or personal belief, not deriving from a transcendent
authority, faces no transcendent or afterlife consequences for
disobeying her conscience. 118 Moreover, such objections lie
squarely within the mix of ideas, values, and information from
which the political process creates civil law. 11 9
The Free Exercise Clause "constitutionalizes" these distinctive features of religion, permitting government to accom120
modate religion without violating the Establishment Clause.
The Court has consistently held that the state may accommodate religion beyond the floor set by the Free Exercise
Clause. 121 From the founding era to the present, state legislatures and Congress have granted exemptions from general laws
beyond what the Free Exercise Clause required. 122 Thus, while
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause's requirements diminished under Smith, 123 the values embodied in the Clause con124
tinue to provide justification for legislative accommodations.

116. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
117. Ingber, supra note 106, at 282.
118. Cf. GARVEY, supra note 93, at 53 (making a similar argument in the
context of military duty).
119. See Ingber, supra note 106, at 286.
120. Justice Brennan explained the unique constitutional position of accommodations:
[T]he interrelationship of the Religion Clauses has permitted government to take religion into account when necessary... to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) (noting that
"[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation[s]" are not "co-extensive" with
the free exercise mandates).
122. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 723 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); McConnell, supranote 89, at 1466-73.
123. See supranotes 48-57 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705-06 (noting that "government may
(and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and... may do so
without violating the establishment clause" (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment
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B. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE'S LIMITS ON
ACCOMMODATIONS: THE LINE BETWEEN THE PERMISSIBLE AND
THE PROHIBITED

Given the existence of a realm of constitutional accommodations, where does the Establishment Clause draw the boundary between permissible and prohibited accommodations? Like
most areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court's
decisions on this point fail to draw a clear boundary.1 25 Courts
usually first invoke the leading, though much maligned Lemon
test, under which a law must: (1) "have a secular legislative
purpose," (2) have a "primary effect ...that neither advances
nor inhibits religion," and (3) not "foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."1 26 Courts often incorporate
Lemon's "entanglement" prong into its "effect" inquiry, considering "excessive entanglement" one of a variety of impermissi12 7
ble "effects."
On its face, the Lemon test seems ill-equipped to evaluate
accommodations-religion-specific laws intended to facilitate
religious activity-since under a literal reading of Lemon, accommodations necessarily seem to lack both a "secular legislative purpose" and an effect that avoids "advancing religion."' 2 8
Thus, while the Lemon formula serves as a framework for judicial analysis, 129 Supreme Court decisions reveal certain principles that distinguish between permissible and illicit accommodations.

Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987))); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 453 (1971) (noting that Congress may "accommodate free exercise values,
in line with 'our happy tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience"' (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634
(1931))).
125. Cf. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with the 'long list of constitutional scholars" who criticize the Court's jurisprudence for producing an "Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes").
126. Lemon v. Kurtzman,- 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see, e.g., Madison v.
Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Bass v.
Madison, 72 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2004) (No. 03-1404).
127. See, e.g., Riter, 355 F.3d at 319. The Court endorsed such an approach
in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-34 (1997).
128. See Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 501 (2002).
129. See, e.g., Benning v. Georgia, Nos. 04-10979 & 04-11044, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24842, at *20 (l1th Cir. Dec. 2, 2004).
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1. Amos's Deferential Stance Toward Accommodations
In the leading accommodation case, Corporationof the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 130 the Court employed a rationale that
grants the state wide latitude to enact accommodations of religion.131 An employee of a religious entity, discharged for his
nonmembership in the religion, challenged an amendment to
Title VII exempting religious organizations from antidiscrimination provisions. 132 Previously, the Title VII exemption allowed religious organizations to discriminate only when
hiring of religious positions, but Congress broadened it to allow
for discrimination when hiring of nonreligious positions as
well. 133 Nonetheless, under Lemon's purpose requirement, the
Court held the exemption had "a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference" with religious exercise. 3 4 The Court concluded that without the exemption, Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions would instill
fear of potential liability, thereby significantly burdening a re1 35
ligious organization's ability to carry out its mission. Yet, the
Court made clear that the exemption was not necessary to
avoid burdening conscientious religious exercise such that the
136 Instead, the
Free Exercise Clause compelled the exemption.
137
permissible.
accommodation was merely
The Amos plaintiffs argued that exempting only religious
employers from Title VII's antidiscrimination laws violated
equal protection principles. 3 8 The Amos Court dismissed this
argument summarily, concluding that where the government
"acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that
the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities." 39 Amos's holding on this point greatly undermines the
130.

483 U.S. 327 (1987).

131. See id. at 335-39; cf. Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 29091 (1994) (describing the Amos majority's "unusually strong doctrine of accommodation").
132. Amos, 483 U.S. at 329-31. The exemption is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (2000).
133. Id. at 335-36.
134. Id. at 335.
135. Id. at 336.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 338-39.
139. Id. at 338.
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equal treatment view, which maintains that the Establishment
Clause requires the state to extend the same protections to
nonreligious counterparts as it extends to religious individuals
or institutions. 140 Thus, Amos's rationale provides great leeway
for the state to benefit religious claimants without regard to
similarly situated nonreligious claimants as long as the statute's purpose is to lift governmental interference with religious
exercise. 141

Opponents of accommodations seek to limit Amos's holding
by arguing that the Court upheld the Title VII exemption only
because it was necessary to prevent an unconstitutional entanglement of government and religion. 142 This justification, however, does not appear in Amos and clashes sharply with the
Amos Court's strongly deferential tone toward accommodations. 143 The Amos Court explained that "[t]here is ample room
under the Establishment Clause" for legislatures to enact accommodations and explicitly noted that the Free Exercise
Clause did not mandate the exemption. 144
2. Texas Monthly's Narrower View of Permissible
Accommodations
Just two years after deciding Amos, the Court splintered in
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock 145 over another religion-specific
exemption, as a plurality invalidated a Texas law that exempted religious magazines from sales taxes. 146 Texas claimed
the exemption lifted the tax burden on religious exercise and
reduced entanglement between religious publications and the
140. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 81, at 1017. For a discussion of the
equal treatment view, see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
141. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339 (holding that where a statute is "motivated
by a permissible purpose of lifting governmental interference with the exercise
of religion" and is neutral among religions, Congress need only show the classification is rationally related to that legitimate purpose).
142. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 13 (1998). The Sixth Circuit
quoted at length from Hamilton's article as it invalidated RLUIPA. See Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 263-64 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
308 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-9877).
143. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-36.
144. Id. at 334.
145. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
146. Id. Justice Brennan wrote on behalf of Justices Marshall and Stevens.
Id. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, with which Justice O'Connor
joined, accords substantially with Justice Brennan's views on the exemption's
invalidity under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 26-29.
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State. 147 Justice Brennan's opinion, which presented the most
limited view of permissible accommodations, rejected the
State's argument, since nothing in the record showed that paying the tax contradicted a religious belief or infringed on religious practice. 148 In essence, paying the tax violated no conscientious religious exercise. 149 In Justice Brennan's view, a
religion-specific exemption could stand only if it could "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." 150 To illustrate this principle, he suggested that the military could legitimately exempt
from its dress code servicemen whose religions required them
15 1
to wear certain headgear.
Since the obligation of paying a sales tax did not conflict
with any conscientious religious exercise, the plurality concluded that the exemption was too narrow, and it could be
viewed only as state-sponsorship of religious material. 152 Absent a "significant state-imposed deterrent to free exercise,"
Texas could only pursue a religion-neutral goal, such as supporting general "cultural, intellectual, and moral betterment,"
through religion-neutral means such as a tax exemption for any
153
publication devoted to those broad subjects.
Two factors emerge from Texas Monthly and Amos that
help determine whether an accommodation violates the Establishment Clause. First, the state's purpose in granting the accommodation must be to alleviate a significant governmentimposed burden on religious exercise. 154 If a state cannot show
it acted to eliminate a threat to religious exercise, a court will
likely conclude the accommodation constitutes an impermissible endorsement of religion. 155 Under Amos, the burdened religious exercise need not be conscientious; that is, the exemption
need not be essential to avoid a conflict between government
147. Id. at 17.
148. Id. at 18.
149. Conscientious religious exercise refers to those actions or forbearances
that a believer understands to be required by her religion. See supra notes
108-19 and accompanying text.
150. Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 15.
151. Id. at 18 n.8.
152. Id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (concluding that the religionspecific exemption amounted to state endorsement of a religious message).
153. Id. at 15-16.
154. See id. at 15; Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336
(1987).
155. See Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 15.
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policy and a believer's religious obligation.156 Under Texas
Monthly's plurality view, however, the burden must be of this
157
more serious nature.
The second inquiry looks at the breadth of class the accommodation benefits. Amos and other cases clearly establish
that the government can never accommodate one religion but
not another similarly situated religion. 158 It is less clear, however, when the state may protect only religious exercise and not
comparable nonreligious activity. At a minimum, the state may
grant such accommodations when lifting burdens on conscientious religious exercise; even Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly
opinion admits this. 159 The Amos rationale goes further, allowing the state to benefit religious exercise only when it acts to
lift any significant burden on religious activity, including activity that is not conscientious (i.e. not required by the religion). 160
3.

Effects on the Accommodating Party and Nonbeneficiaries

To distinguish between a permissible accommodation and a
law that offends the Establishment Clause, courts also examine
the accommodation's effect on (1) the accommodating party and
(2) the nonbeneficiaries. 16 1 Undesirable effects on the accommodating party can take several shapes. It is impermissible for
an accommodation of religion to place an undue or absolute
burden on the party accommodating the religious exercise.1 62
For this reason, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,163 the
Court struck down a Connecticut statute shielding employees
who refused to work on their Sabbath from discharge. 164 The
statute at issue imposed on employers "an absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious prac-

156.

See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36; supra notes 138-41 and accompanying

text.
157. See Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 15-18.
158. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706-07 (1994) (invalidating
a village's creation of a separate school district for a sect of Judaism because it
singled out a particular religion for accommodation); Amos, 483 U.S. at 338;
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ('The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.").
159. See Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 15-18.
160. See Amos, at 483 U.S. at 335-36.
161. See Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 15-18.
162. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985).
163. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
164. Id. at 709-10.
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tices of the employee" and failed to include exceptions for an
make "reasonable
employer's situation or allow the employer to
165
accommodation" proposals to the employee.
In Amos, the Court distinguished between laws that involve the government's "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement" in religious affairs and a permissible accommodation that merely allows religious individuals or
institutions to fulfill their obligations independently. 166 The
Court relied on this distinction to uphold the exemption from
Title VII's ban on employment discrimination, explaining that
a law is impermissible if its effect suggests that "the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and
influences."'167 Relatedly, the Court has viewed accommodations
more favorably if they tend to keep government separate from
church affairs. 168

The Court also considers whether the accommodation burdens nonbeneficiaries. For example, in Estate of Thornton, the
Court noted that the Sabbatarian accommodation forced nonreligious employees, even those with seniority, to compensate for
the Sabbath observer who opted not to work on weekends.169 In
Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion found problematic the sales tax exemption on religious periodicals because
it allocated a greater share of the tax burden onto nonbeneficiaries. 170
Finally, some commentators argue that courts should consider whether an accommodation induces individuals to adopt
certain beliefs or practices, or whether it merely facilitates the
exercise of independently adopted religious beliefs. 171 The
Court has never employed this "inducement" analysis, but has
often held that the Establishment Clause forbids government
from sending messages of endorsement of religion. 172 The noendorsement standard does not foreclose the government from
165. Id.
166. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987)
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
167. Id.
168. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339; Walz, 397 U.S. at 674; cf. Bd. of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (striking down a "gerrymandered" school
district, serving an Orthodox Jewish community, as "an allocation of political
power on a religious criterion").
169. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 n.9 (1985).
170. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 & 18-19 n.8 (1989).
171. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 19, at 35.
172. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 8-9.
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accommodating religion, though, since, in the Court's view, "a
reasonable observer would take into account the values underlying the Free Exercise Clause in assessing whether the challenged practice conveyed a message of endorsement."'173
To summarize, three general factors guide whether an accommodation is permissible or violates the Establishment
Clause: (1) whether the accommodation alleviates a government-imposed burden on religious exercise; (2) the breadth of
the accommodation in relation to the burden imposed by the
regulation; and (3) the effect the accommodation has on the accommodating party and nonbeneficiaries.1 74
III. RLUIPA DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
In light of these factors, the Supreme Court should reverse
Cutter v. Wilkinson's holding that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause 175 and uphold RLUIPA as a permissible accommodation of religion. Cutter considered the validity of
RLUIPA on its face, and relied heavily on two district court
opinions, Madison v. Riter176 and Ghashiyah v. Department of
Corrections. 77 This part describes and evaluates these three
cases in the broader context of RLUIPA's constitutionality.
A. RLUIPA LIFTs GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED BURDENS ON
RELIGIOUS EXERCISE

The Cutter court concluded that RLUIPA was not necessary to lift a significant burden on religious exercise, and thus

173. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 632 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
174. Different scholars reach substantially similar conclusions regarding
the relevant factors. See, e.g., Shawn P. Bailey, The Establishment Clause and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized PersonsAct of 2000, 16 REGENT
U. L. REV. 53, 82-87 (2003); Anne Y. Chiu, Note, When Prisoners are Weary
and Their Religious Exercise Burdened, RLUIPA Provides Some Rest for Their
Souls, 79 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2004).
175. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 125 S.Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct 12, 2004) (No. 03-9877).
176. 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003), rev'd, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.
2003), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Bass v. Madison, 72 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S.
Apr. 6, 2004) (No. 03-1404).
177. 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003). The Cutter court found the district court
cases to be "remarkably well-worded and persuasive" opinions. 349 F.3d at
262.
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lacked the prerequisite context of a constitutional accommodation. 178 The court reasoned that since Congress did not show
that prisons burden religious liberty extraordinarily, Congress
179
could not grant religious liberty extraordinary protection.
The court contended that because prisons restrict religious exercise to the same extent as they restrict other fundamental
freedoms, such as speech and association, Congress's goal in
protecting only religious freedom was to endorse religious exer0
cise.18
Cutter's rationale on this point creates an unprecedented
requirement for an accommodation: the burden it lifts must affect religious liberty more severely than it affects other liberties. '1 1 No constitutional doctrine, however, currently requires
82
legislatures to protect all fundamental rights at equal levels.
Because the rights are substantively different, such a rule
would be both illogical and unworkable. For example, an employer's dress code may inhibit employees' religious exercise in
the same way that it inhibits their ability to engage in political
speech. The dress code may prohibit both a crucifix necklace
and a "War Is Not the Answer" pin. Yet, federal law presently
requires employers to reasonably accommodate only religious
exercise, not political speech.' 8 3 This result makes sense because the various fundamental rights promote different values. 8 4 In upholding RLUIPA, the Fourth Circuit illustrated
this point, contending that Congress could justifiably expand
expanding
prisoners' religious liberty without simultaneously
85
pornography.1
view
to
right
Amendment
their First
The Cutter court also found that RLUIPA favors religion by
increasing religious liberty, contrary to the Supreme Court's

178. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265-66.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 264-65.
181. See id. at 265-66 ("RLUIPA's enhanced protection for religious rights
might not violate the First Amendment requirement of neutrality if Congress
had enacted RLUIPA based upon evidence that religious rights are at greater
risk of deprivation in the prison system than other fundamental rights.").
182. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Bass v. Madison, 72 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2004) (No.
03-1404) (finding "no requirement that legislative protections for fundamental
rights march in lockstep").
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
184. See GARVEY, supra note 93, at 12-19.
185. Riter, 355 F.3d. at 319.
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holdings in OLone v. Estate of Shabazz1 86 and Turner v. Safley. 18 7 In those cases, the Court held that the First Amendment
mandates only low-level rationality review of prison regulations
that burden religious exercise.188 Cutter interpreted the Court's
holdings to mean that "strict scrutiny is not necessary to protect the religious rights of prisoners."'1 9 The better reading of
O'Lone and Turner is that the Court balanced prisoners' religious liberty against the need for judicial deference to "ensur[e]
the ability of corrections officials 'to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration."'1 90 Thus, the Court's holdings in
these cases were analogous to its position in Smith: the First
Amendment permits but does not require government to lift
burdens on religious exercise. 191 The Establishment Clause allows the state, within limits, to promote the values of the Free
Exercise Clause.192

On its face, RLUIPA's protections apply only when the
government "impose[s] a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person."'193 RLUIPA's purpose is to benefit a population Congress has found to be particularly vulnerable to religious persecution. 194 Earlier drafts of RLUIPA would have extended to any governmental action that receives federal
funding. 9 5 Instead, Congress narrowed the Act to address what
it perceived as situations that threaten religious liberty. 196
Viewed in light of its history, the Act creates not an endorsement of religion but a justified protection of religion against capricious state interference. This brings RLUIPA squarely
within Amos's approval of laws which purposes are to alleviate

186.
187.

482 U.S. 342 (1987).
482 U.S. 78 (1987); see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 263, 265

(6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct 12, 2004) (No. 03-9877).
188.
189.

O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349-50; Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-90.
Cutter, 349 F.3d at 266.

190. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 79).
191. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (noting Smith's invitation to legislatures to enact accommodations).
192. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (describing the relationship between the Religion Clauses).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
194. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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government burdens on religious exercise, whether conscien97
tious or not.'
. A somewhat closer call is whether RLUIPA would survive
Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly requirement that an accommodation must lift a substantial deterrent to conscientious religious exercise. 1 98 Congress intended RLUIPA's protections to
mirror the free exercise jurisprudence that began with Sherbert. 199 Any accommodation that the Sherbert test would have
required should pass Texas Monthly's standard, since the Court
decided Texas Monthly while Sherbert was the governing free
exercise test. 20 0 Moreover, exemptions claims that succeeded

under the Sherbert test tended to involve conscientious religious exercise-situations in which a government policy con20 1 However, RLUIPA
tradicted the claimant's religious duty.
defines "religious exercise" to include any religious exercise,
"whether or not compelled by, or central to" the individual's beliefs. 202 This definition suggests that RLUIPA protects religious
exercise that is less than conscientious, such as the publishing
20 3
of a religious magazine in Texas Monthly. If the Court were
to interpret RLUIPA as a broad shield for any activity claimed
to be related to religious belief, the statute could be viewed as
20 4
Such a broad protection would
endorsing religious activity.

be disconnected from the underlying free exercise valuerespect for the believer who faces clashing legal and religious
requirements.
However, the Court need not view RLUIPA as suffering
from this flaw. In adopting this seemingly broad definition,
Congress intended not to extend RLUIPA's protections beyond
the Sherbert test, but to avoid forcing judges to interpret reli-

197. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36
(1987); supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (describing Amos's protection of nonconscientious religious exercise).
198. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); supra notes
145-51 and accompanying text.
199. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 32-33 (1999) (describing the impetus for
the law as Smith's refusal to apply the Sherbert test to generally applicable
laws); infra note 205 and accompanying text.
200. Indeed, even Justice Brennan noted that some accommodations not
mandated by the Sherbert-vintage Free Exercise Clause were permissible under the Establishment Clause. Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
201. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 27.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7) (2000).
203. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
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gious doctrine to determine whether the burdened exercise is
"compelled by" or "central to" the sect's teachings. 205 Congress
was responding to the Court's admonition that judges "are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation."206 The Court could read
RLUIPA's "substantial burden"207 requirement as a constraint
on the scope of the statute, limiting it to the lifting of government burdens on conscientious practices. A broader scope
might create an impermissible sanction of all religious activity.
Under this element, the Court could fairly limit RLUIPA's applicability to situations in which the believer claims to face a
dilemma of conscience due to his or her religious beliefs. This
reading would bring RLUIPA in line with the Sherbert test and
Texas Monthly's requirement 208 that an exemption must alleviate conscientious religious exercise. 209 Indeed, this is how some
lower courts have interpreted "substantial burden."210 Moreover, principles of statutory interpretation dictate that the
Court should avoid creating a constitutional violation. 211 Thus,
RLUIPA appears to satisfy this first factor, whether its purpose
is to relieve a state-imposed burden on religious exercise.

205. See 146 CONG. REC. E1563-64 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Canady) (noting that the definition equated Congress's intent in
RLUIPA's predecessor RFRA, which sought to codify the Sherbert test); cf.
Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated by 522 U.S.
801 (1997) (adopting an interpretation of RFRA that is similar to what Congress enacted in RLUIPA because it "is more faithful both to the statutory
language and to the approach that the courts took before Smith, in cases like
Sherbert").
206. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
208. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
209. Cf. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (1981) (finding a "substantial burden"
where the state conditions receipt of a benefit upon "conduct proscribed by a
religious faith").
210. See, e.g., Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir.
2004) (explaining that a "substantial burden" must interfere with "some central tenet" of one's religious beliefs (quoting Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820
(8th Cir. 1997))); Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 298 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (applying the Thomas definition of "substantial burden"); Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99, 102 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003).
211. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003) (construing the
contested statute in accordance with the Court's "obligation to avoid constitutional problems").

20051

RESPECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

1205

B. RLUIPA'S BREADTH IS APPROPRIATELY RELATED TO THE
BURDEN IT ADDRESSES

While the Cutter court doubted that RLUIPA's true purpose was to lift government burdens on religious exercise, ultimately the court rested its decision on the holding that
2 12
RLUIPA impermissibly benefited only religious adherents.
The court found that RLUIPA's effect was to "advance religion
generally by giving religious prisoners rights superior to those
of nonreligious prisoners." 213 To prove this point, Cutter discussed a hypothetical situation in which a prison guard confis214
cates white supremacist reading material from two inmates.
One inmate holds the literature solely because he believes in a
Jewish conspiracy aimed at world domination, and the other
holds the material as a member of "the Church of Jesus Christ,
Aryan Nation."2 15 The nonreligious inmate could contest the
taking as a violation of his free expression right, and would almost certainly lose under the low-level rationality review applied to such infringements. 2 16 The religious inmate, however,
could bring his claim under RLUIPA's heightened scrutiny, and
2 17
Cutter conwould have a much higher probability of success.
is reliprotected
cluded that "[w]hen the one system of belief
of
requirement
gious belief, Congress has violated the basic
218
Clause."
Establishment
the
in
neutrality embodied
In essence, Cutter's holding embodies the equal treatment
219
It denies
view of the Religion Clauses and religious exercise.
any relevant difference between religious conscientious exercise
and other conscientious conduct, and presumes that govern220
The
ment must treat all objectors to a general law similarly.
equal treatment view seems fair, and a government may desire
212. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 266 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-9877).
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 576 (W.D. Va.
2003)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 577).
219. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (outlining the equal
treatment view).
220. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265 (noting that RLUIPA's effect is to "provide
greater protection to religiously motivated conduct than other conscientious
conduct" (quoting Ghashiyah v. Dep't of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027

(E.D. Wis. 2003))).

1206

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:1179

to extend accommodations more broadly, rather than only to religious objectors. However, reading RLUIPA to require prison
administrators to accommodate all conscientious objectors,
such as the Court read the Vietnam War era military exemption statute, would increase administrative costs and difficulties significantly-bolstering a state or court's justification for
denying exemptions to anyone. 22 1 For example, a court would
likely view a prison's safety interest in restricting inmates' ability to gather for religious services as much more compelling, if
allowing the religious gathering meant that the prison also had
to accommodate gangs meeting to practice their "ideology." 222

The more fundamental problem with Cutter's endorsement
of the equal treatment doctrine is that it ignores the Religion
Clauses' recognition that conscientious religious exercise differs
from other activity in a relevant way. 223 A core Free Exercise

Clause value is the individual's freedom to prioritize her allegiance to a transcendent reality over her allegiance to the
state. 224 To return to Cutter's hypothetical, the religious inmate
perceives his transcendent Creator as imposing upon him duties that may carry severe, transcendent consequences. 225 The
nonreligious inmate's faithfulness to his ideology involves no
allegiance to an "otherworldly" entity; nor does it affect his
status in some spiritual reality. When a prison policy similarly
requires the two inmates to violate their belief systems, they
are differently situated according to free exercise values. The
Establishment Clause's contours must also reflect this difference. 22 6 As discussed above, the Court can reasonably interpret

RLUIPA's protections to apply to burdens on conscientious religious exercise, where religious objectors are differently situated
than nonreligious objectors. 227 Viewed this way, RLUIPA's
breadth, which benefits only religious exercise, presents no Establishment Clause problem.

221.

See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.

222. Cf. Magarian, supra note 99, at 1986-88 (describing how interpreting
RFRA to include all conscientious objections would naturally lead courts to
deny claims for relief).
223. See supra notes 108-24 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
225. Cf. supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (describing the difference between religious and nonreligious belief systems).
226. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
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C. RLUIPA DOES NOT HAVE IMPERMISSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE
GOVERNMENT OR NONBENEFICIARIES

1. RLUIPA's Effect on the Government
RLUIPA avoids affecting government in ways that the
Court has previously held impermissible. Unlike the accommodation in Estate of Thornton, which gave employees an absolute
right not to work on their Sabbath, RLUIPA allows the government to burden a person's religious rights in the furtherance of a compelling interest. 228 While RLUIPA employs the
terms of strict scrutiny, it is hardly "fatal in fact" to many government regulations as in, for example, the equal protection or
free speech contexts. 229 This is partly because RFRA and
RLUIPA are based on pre-Smith free exercise cases, in which
the Court invoked Sherbert's strict scrutiny standard but applied a less rigorous review. 23 0 Additionally, Congress intended
courts applying RLUIPA to defer to prison administrators,
given the inherent dangers of the prison context and the goals
of the criminal justice system. 231 Lower courts have generally
respected Congress's wish. 2 32 Thus, RLUIPA's effect on government is less severe than its text suggests.
The Madison v. Riter district court, which considered a
plaintiffs request for kosher meals that the prison staff would
have to prepare, concluded that RLUIPA violates the Amos criterion. Under Amos, an accommodation should not cause government to advance the religious practice through active involvement, but should function only to allow individuals to
exercise their religion independently. 233 This criterionwhether the accommodation makes government an accomplice
to the religious activity-should take into account the unique
228. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 705-06
(1985) (describing Connecticut's Sabbath-protection law), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1 (2000) (giving the government the option to demonstrate that the
burden is "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest").
229. Cf. Idleman, supra note 131, at 265-84 (concluding that the Sherbert
compelling interest standard is not an "enormous hurdle" and that the least
restrictive means requirement "proved basically worthless").
230. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
231. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. Jul. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Hatch & Sen. Kennedy).
232. See, e.g., Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir.
2004).
233. 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 576-77 n.9 (W.D. Va. 2003). For a discussion of
Amos's holding on this point, see supratext accompanying notes 166-68.
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circumstances of the prison context, in which government pervades nearly every aspect of the inmate's life. 234 In prison, even
a simple religious exercise is likely to involve prison officials.
For example, for an inmate to access a sacred text, prison staff
must first receive the text, record its presence in the cell's inventory, ensure that it presents no threat to safety, and dictate
when the inmate is free to read it. To find an establishment
problem in this sort of low-level involvement misses the underlying concern of Amos: government should not be so involved
23 5
that it appears to endorse and promote the religious activity.
Public schools provide a useful comparison to the institutions RLUIPA covers, since the state similarly controls pupils'
freedom while they are in school. In Zorach v. Clauson,236 the
Court upheld a "release time" program in which students who
gave teachers their parents' written consent were allowed to
leave the school to receive religious instruction during the
day. 23 7 The religious entities gave teachers attendance lists, so
they could verify that the released students were not truant. 238
The Court rejected the argument that a teacher's involvement
amounted to a promotion of the program, noting that the cooperation was limited "to the extent of making it possible for her
students to participate" in the religious training. 23 9 Likewise,
RLUIPA requires prison officials to take only those steps necessary to allow inmates to exercise their independently-chosen
religion; it requires no promotion or endorsement of religious
activity. Using this rationale, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court in Madison v. Riter, finding that government
could facilitate kosher diet observance without effectively en-

dorsing

it.240

In Ghashiyah v. Department of Corrections, the district
court argued that RLUIPA impermissibly forces prison officials
and reviewing courts "to become involved with, knowledgeable
about, and exceedingly sensitive to the varied religious prac234. The Court has adopted unique standards for prison contexts in other
doctrinal areas, such as prisoners' claims for violations of fundamental rights.
See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987).
235. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
236. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
237. Id. at 308.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 313.
240. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for
cert. filed sub noam. Bass v. Madison, 72 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2004) (No.
03-1404).
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tices of their inmates." 241 In Smith, the Supreme Court did not
approve of the state playing this role, and viewed it as an impetus for reinterpreting the Free Exercise Clause. 242 Importantly,
though, Smith viewed this sort of entanglement not as a constitutional violation, but as a problem of institutional competency. 243 Smith described the state's poor ability to evaluate,
with consistent results, the relevance or plausibility of religious
claims. 244 Smith's answer was to roll back the Free Exercise
Clause's mandate that government accommodate religion, reducing the frequency of instances in which the state engaged in
the sensitive evaluation of religion. 245 Since this problem of
competency did not implicate the Establishment Clause, Smith
left the distribution of accommodations to the political process. 24 6 Governments could choose to take on the costs and diffi-

culties of accommodating religion, but the Constitution neither
required nor prohibited it.247 This describes RLUIPA: Congress
chose to extend accommodations in the prison context, having
found the increase in religious liberty to be worth the attendant
costs and difficulties.
RLUIPA's Effects on Nonbeneficiaries
The Ghashiyah district court argued that RLUIPA burdened nonreligious inmates by prioritizing religious activities
in the allocation of limited prison resources. 248 For example, an
institution likely spends a marginal amount more per meal
when it must provide a few kosher meals, since it loses the savings of scale on those meals. The Court expressed similar concerns in Estate of Thornton, noting that accommodating Sabbatarians meant that nonreligious employees would receive
fewer weekend days off.249 However, because that case involved
2.

241. Ghashiyah v. Dep't of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1031 (E.D. Wis.
2003), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
Idleman, supra note 131, at 296.
242. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887-89 (1990).
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 890.
247. See id.
248. Ghashiyah v. Dep't of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1029 (E.D. Wis.
2003), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
249. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 n.9 (1985); see
also Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (noting that the tax
exemption shifted the tax burden to others).

1210

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:1179

private parties, the costs of accommodation were concentrated,
heavily burdening the accommodating parties. 250 When the
government is the accommodating party, as is true under
RLUIPA, the costs of accommodation can be distributed more
widely. 25 1 Moreover, it is impractical to require that accommodations of religion impose no costs on others, because at some
level all accommodations will impose some costs. 252 The values

that accommodations promote are embedded in the First
Amendment, and thus justify some incidental costs.

253

Courts

should use the "compelling state interest" element of RLUIPA
to draw the line between reasonable accommodations and
overly burdensome ones. The state can make a strong argument that if it were to grant some inmates exceptionally expensive accommodations, it would undermine its interests in efficiency and in avoiding any appearance of favoritism that could
threaten prison safety. Incorporating these concerns in
RLUIPA's application would avoid results that unduly burden
nonbeneficiaries.
The Cutter court found that RLUIPA had the impermissible effect of inducing prisoners to adopt or feign religious belief
to access the statute's protections. 254 For support, Cutter
pointed to a passage in Texas Monthly255 that forbade the government from "compelling nonadherents to support.., favored
religious organizations." 256 RLUIPA lacks any element of compulsion that is comparable to the sales tax exemption in Texas
Monthly, which required taxpayers to subsidize a religious message. 25 7 RLUIPA requires nothing of nonreligious inmates. As

for the possibility that RLUIPA may induce an inmate to adopt
religious beliefs, the Court has never indicated concern that an

250. See LAURENCE
ed. 1988).
251. See id.

H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1200 (2d

252. Justice Brennan found a way to construe the Title VII exemption for
religious employers in Amos as disadvantaging secular organizations vis-A-vis
religious entities in the hiring process. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340-43 (1987).
253. Cf. McConnell, supra note 57, at 704 ('The legislature should have as
much latitude to protect the exercise of religion that it has to protect other important values in life.").
254. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 266-67 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-9877).
255. Id. at 266 (citing Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)).
256. Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 9.
257. See id. at 5-6.
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accommodation of religion might sway an adult's conscience. 258
Further, prison administrators and courts scrutinize inmates'
RLUIPA claims for sincerity of religious belief. 259 This serves as
a strong deterrent to instrumental claims of belief.
Similarly, Cutter held that nonreligious prisoners would
view RLUIPA as a government endorsement of religion, since
only religious inmates qualify for its protections. 2 60 This argument proves too much: it would invalidate any religion-specific
accommodation, and clearly some accommodations are legitimate. 261 Consider, for example, Title VII, the federal statute
requiring employers to reasonably accommodate their employees' religious exercise unless it would cause the employer undue hardship. 262 Justice O'Connor, the endorsement test's main
proponent, argued that an observer would not see Title VII as
endorsing religion because it "calls for reasonable rather than
absolute accommodation and extends that requirement to all
religious beliefs and practices."263 Likewise, an observer of
RLUIPA's effects would note its broad applicability to all religions, its purpose to lift substantial burdens on religious exercise, and its less-than-absolute protections, 264 concluding that
Congress meant not to endorse religious practice but to accommodate it. In summary, RLUIPA does not affect the government or nonbeneficiaries in ways that violate the Establishment Clause.
IV. UPHOLDING RLUIPA WILL PRESERVE AN
IMPORTANT REALM OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION
In considering Cutter, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to determine the boundaries of the Religion Clauses regarding accommodations of religion. Smith all but eliminated
the instances in which the Free Exercise Clause requires the
258. The Court's concern with vulnerable consciences has been limited to
children in school settings. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
259. See, e.g., Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
260. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267.
261. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). The Court implicitly affirmed the statute's
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1977); see McConnell, supra note 57, at
704.
263. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
264. See § 2000cc-1.
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state to accommodate religious exercise. 265 After Smith, the
protection of religious liberty is largely in the hands of legislatures. The combination of growing religious diversity and the
reach of the modern welfare state means that today, more than
ever, the state is likely to burden religious exercise. 266 Permissible accommodations are the means by which our constitutional system protects the free exercise of religion, respecting
the diversity and importance of individuals' beliefs. RLUIPA
represents an evenhanded attempt to protect religious liberty
in a setting in which the state is likely to burden it arbitrarily.
Should the Court invalidate RLUIPA, it would effectively
eliminate the realm of permissible accommodations by stating
that the alleviation of a state-imposed burden on the religious
conscience cannot be the basis for a classification in law. Such a
decision would signal the triumph of the equal treatment approach, along with its view that religion is indistinguishable
from other cultural entities and activities for constitutional
purposes. This would not only fly in the face of our constitutional traditions, but would also contradict the understandings
of most Americans, for many of whom faith is an integral part
of their personhood. Such a decision would call into question
numerous accommodations that currently exist. For example,
the state may not be able to require employers to respect employees' religious holidays, 267 allow religious headwear in the
military, 268 protect the clergy-penitent privilege, 2 69 allow
American Indian religious exercise on federal lands, 270 alter
regulation of milk production to respect religious belief,271 or
exempt religious rituals from health codes governing the handling of corpses. 272 These and other permissible accommodations are important tools through which the ubiquitous modern
state can preserve the principles underlying the Religion
Clauses.

265.

See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.

266.

See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 138-55 (1993).

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See § 2000e-2.
See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000).
See WIS. STAT. § 905.06(2) (2004).
See H.R. REP. No. 100-713 (1988).
See MINN. STAT. § 32.415(a) (2004).
See MINN. STAT. § 149A.01(3)(b) (2004).
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CONCLUSION
Government officials and regulations control nearly every
aspect of the lives of persons living in institutions, impinging
greatly on their religious exercise. When a state policy requires
a person to disobey the dictates of his or her religion, that person faces an exceptional hardship, since conscientious religious
exercise derives from a transcendent source that carries serious
weight and consequences for the believer. The Constitution and
the Court's jurisprudence allow the state to remove such hardships out of respect for religious liberty, which prioritizes religious obligations over those owed to the state. The distinctive
nature of religious belief and the provisions of the Religion
Clause justify the state accommodating religious exercise, and
treating religion and nonreligion differently in certain situations.
RLUIPA meets the criteria that determine whether an accommodation is permissible or crosses the line into an establishment of religion. Congress enacted it to remove significant,
unnecessary governmental burdens on prisoners' religious exercise. Courts can interpret it to apply only in situations involving conscientious religious conduct, in which the believer truly
is not similarly situated to the nonbeliever. RLUIPA is crafted
so as not to impose absolute or unjustifiable burdens on the
government and nonbeneficiaries. By upholding RLUIPA, the
Court can stabilize the realm of permissive, discretionary accommodations through which legislatures protect religious liberty in our constitutional system.

